




Individual Consciousness: An Argument for the Numerical Identity of 
All Conscious Existence 
  
Abstract 
If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to 
individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these 
consciousnesses, one’s own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but 
only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular 
consciousness.  But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context 
to be specified.  This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately be united as, or in, 
some single conscious entity underlying the apparent plurality of individuals. 
 
All of my conscious experience reflects the perspective of one particular living organism. The 
body of this organism, continually the same one, is constantly embedded at the centre of my 
perception, amidst a varying configuration of other perceived objects, thus defining my location 
within the world. The findings of neuroscience suggest that specific conditions and events within 
this body, especially within its brain, can be precisely correlated with every aspect and detail of 
my conscious experience. 
The existence of many other living bodies, with behaviour and properties similar to those of my 
body, suggests the existence of many other consciousnesses, correlated with and centred on these 
other bodies. But whatever other consciousnesses may exist, whether correlated with living 
bodies or not, it is evident that one particular consciousness, centred on one particular body, 
stands out as the only one immediately present, here and now, manifest, to hand, directly 
experienced as me, or mine. 
But surely every fully existent consciousness must likewise, by definition, be experienced as 
immediately present, singled out as the one which is me or mine. If there is a plurality of such 
consciousnesses, how is it possible for each separate consciousness both to be the one singled 
out as immediately present, and not to be the one singled out as immediately present? 
If there is really a plurality of consciousnesses, then the statement "only this one particular 
consciousness is immediately present" can be true, not absolutely and categorically, but only 
subject, or in relation, to some particular context of conditions and qualifications singling out 
the one particular consciousness. What could this context conceivably be? It is not satisfactory to 
say that the statement is true only if uttered, or thought, by the individual whose consciousness it 
refers to: if there is actually a plurality of immediately present consciousnesses then it is false to 
say there is only one, no matter who says it. Nor is it satisfactory to say that the particular 
consciousness is the only one "immediately present to me"; because, if the phrases "immediately 
present" and "me/mine" are taken to refer to one and the same quality (of being directly manifest, 
to hand, here and now), then the phrase "immediately present to me" is a tautology, and again it 
would be false to say there is only one such consciousness if in fact there is a plurality. Nor is it 
satisfactory to regard the phrase "to me" as a qualification of "immediately present", as if there 
were different types or qualities of immediate presence, each specific to a different conscious 
individual. Possession of immediate presence, in the sense of "being directly manifest, to hand, 
here and now", seems to be an adequate criterion for recognising a fully existent consciousness; 
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but in order to function as a criterion, immediate presence has to be regarded as a predefined, 
identical quality with respect to which any given entity may be judged. Even if different types of 
immediate presence were possible, the original problem of specifying the context for 
experiencing a particular one of these would still remain. Alternatively, "me" might be 
understood as referring to some entity conceptually separable from the consciousness itself: for 
example, the body, or some kind of "ego" or "soul" experiencing the consciousness; but if this 
separate "me" entity is not the only one of its kind, then the same problem of specifying a 
context singling out a particular individual from the plurality of such entities again arises. 
Similar difficulties occur if the particular consciousness is said to be immediately present "only 
if one is this consciousness"; since, either the phrase "one is" is synonymous with "is 
immediately present", or else "one" refers to an entity or property singled out in some 
unspecified context from a plurality. It is also, I think, not satisfactory to say that each 
consciousness intrinsically defines or indicates its own context, through being the only one 
immediately present to itself, or in relation to some part or referent of itself, such as its central 
brain/body entity, or some particular sequence of experience. If there is actually a plurality of 
consciousnesses, then the statement "only this particular consciousness is immediately present to 
itself" is false, since each of the several consciousnesses is immediately present to itself. The 
statement "only this particular consciousness is immediately present centred on this particular 
brain/body entity, or having this particular sequence of experience" may be true; but if there is a 
plurality of immediately present consciousnesses, associated with different sequences of 
experience and/or brain/body entities, then the question arises: what is the context in which the 
consciousness associated with this particular sequence of experience, or this particular 
brain/body entity, out of the pluralities that exist, is singled out as the consciousness being 
experienced as immediately present? This amounts to the same as the original question: what is 
the context in which this particular consciousness is singled out as the only one immediately 
present? The attempt to address the question by describing the context in terms of the 
consciousness has thus led to the true but unsatisfying answer, that "only this consciousness is 
immediately present when this particular brain/body entity, or sequence of experience, is 
immediately present". In fact, every attempted way of specifying the context will fail to provide 
a satisfactory answer, since there will always be a plurality of analogous contexts, each 
corresponding to a different consciousness, with each of these consciousness-context structures 
having to be conceived both as being, and not being, the one singled out as identifying the one 
particular consciousness being experienced as immediately present. The original question will 
therefore arise again in the form: what is the further context within which one particular 
consciousness-context structure is singled out, from the plurality of such structures, as the one 
underlying the immediately present experience? In effect, every attempt to specify the required 
context will achieve no more than a fuller description, either broader or more detailed, of the 
phenomenon for which the context is required, and thus will fail to get any nearer to an adequate 
account of the context itself. 
If the co-existence of a plurality of consciousnesses, each experienced as the only one 
immediately present, is not a coherently describable state of affairs, even with each 
consciousness referred to a uniquely corresponding context, this would indicate that at least one 
of the following two statements is false: "each consciousness is experienced as the only one 
immediately present", or "there is a plurality of co-existing consciousnesses". The first of these 
statements seems undeniably true, even a matter of definition. If the second statement is false, 
this could be because there is not a plurality of consciousnesses, or because the consciousnesses 
are not co-existent; that is, they exist only one at a time. In the latter case, if the consciousnesses 
are really absolutely separate (a true plurality or disjunction, comprising only mutually exclusive 
individuals), then the original problem arises once again: how to specify the context within 





experienced as immediately present. If the consciousnesses are not absolutely separate, then they 
are ultimately united as, or in, some single entity underlying the plurality. The plurality would be 
of self-contained sequences of experience, all belonging to, or constituting, a single conscious 
entity, the only one of its kind. The immediately present experience would always belong to the 
single underlying consciousness, and may be imagined as belonging to each of the plurality of 
sequences of experience, not simultaneously, but one at a time, as if successively. This is similar, 
or at least analogous, to the way a person’s present experience belongs in turn to each of a 
plurality of successive days, especially if the person is partly amnesic and does not remember 
experiencing previous days, nor perceive the continuity between adjacent days. 
